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This paper is of interest for two reasons. First, it provides a simple algorithm for solving an
optimal control problem in which the law of motion of the economy is a Markov regime-switching
vector autoregression. This allows, among other things, to model asymmetric multiplicative
uncertainty. Second, it applies this algorithm to study optimal monetary policy in a stylised small
open economy model modiﬁed to incorporate a boom-bust cycle in the exchange rate. The
economy is assumed to alternate randomly between two states: a ‘no-bubble’ regime, in which the
exchange rate ﬂuctuates, in a stationary way, around its long-run equilibrium; and a ‘bubble’
regime, in which the exchange rate (absent any offsetting impact of policy or exogenous shocks)
increasingly deviates from it. We compute the optimal policy rule for this economy, as opposed to
an optimised reaction function. This rule is regime-contingent in that policy response varies
according to whether the economy is experiencing a bubble or not.
The main results are as follows. First, while the optimal weights on output and inﬂa t i o nd on o t
vary much between regimes, the optimal reaction to the asset price is highly dependent on the
regime as well as the stochastic properties of the bubble. Second, uncertainty about the regime
makes policy more cautious. Third, a policymaker uncertain about the true stochastic properties
of the asset price tends to obtain a ‘robust’ performance (i.e. minmax outcome) by responding
little to the asset price. Finally, over-estimating the probability of an incipient bubble is generally
more costly than under-estimating it.
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JEL classiﬁcation: C6, E5
3Summary
Your summary here, please.
41 Introduction
Sudden changes in economic behaviour are one of the key uncertainties facing the policymaker.
Even if the policymaker were to know the correct economic model today, she would face the risk
that tomorrow some of the behavioural equations as well as the properties (mean, persistence, etc.)
of the exogenous shocks could dramatically change. Indeed, in contrast to standard models of
monetary policy, in which uncertainty is typically modelled as the dispersion of a symmetric
distribution, actual policymaking often involves the discussion of risks that are skewed or
one-sided.(1) Some of these risks involve large or extreme events, such as the collapse of an asset
price, an oil price hike, and abrupt changes in some key aspects of their econometric models (e.g.
t h ed e g r e eo fe x c h a n g er a t ep a s s - t h r o u g h ) . F o re xample, one of the major risks that has worried
some MPC members in recent years has been the possibility that sterling could suddenly fall by a
material amount. See e.g. the minutes of February 2002 MPC meeting: "(...) Some members
placed weight on upside risks to the inﬂation outlook. Two main risks to inﬂation were
emphasised: from the possibility of a depreciation of sterling’s exchange rate and from the
possibility that consumption would not slow as much as projected" (p.10). At the same meeting
some members were also worried about potential ﬁnancial imbalances: "Persistently rising debt
levels potentially increased the probability that any adjustment to household balance sheets would
be abrupt rather than smooth, with attendant risk of a fall in asset prices and, thus, in the value of
collateral. (...) In the view of some members, therefore, rising debt levels risked increasing the
volatility of output and so of inﬂation in the medium term, potentially making future inﬂation
outturns more uncertain. Other members placed little or no weight on this." (p. 5). Indeed, a
common concern amongst central bankers is that the true or perceived existence of ﬁnancial
imbalances or asset price misalignments could at some point in time lead to sudden and large
adjustments in asset prices, with potentially adverse consequences for inﬂation and output
stability.(2)
How to respond to potential large asymmetric shocks or abrupt shifts in economic behaviour is
very much an open question. Should the policymaker try to pre-empt the shock or adopt a "wait
and see" approach (i.e. respond to the shock only if and when it materialises)? In this regard,
(1) See e.g. the discussion of skews and asset prices in Goodhart (2001), pp. 178-180.
(2) A proper account of large risks of this type could also help explain part of the (large) deviations often observed
between the actual policy rate and that implied by various versions of estimated simple rules. As pointed out by
Svensson (2002), estimated Taylor rules for a closed economy like the US leaves approximately one third of the
variance unexplained.
5there are at least two difﬁculties that the policymaker faces in reaching a decision. The ﬁrst one is
to assess the relative lags with which a given shock and policy affects the economy. If policy
operates with longer lags, there is clearly a trade-off between "not taking insurance" against the
shock and having the inappropriate policy in place in case the shock does not occur. On the
contrary, if a shock affects demand or inﬂation with the same delay as policy, then preemption
may not be necessary, provided the shock is observable when it materialises. The second
difﬁculty concerns the possible endogeneity to policy of the risk that the policymaker might want
to pre-empt. This is particularly relevant when the risks concern the behaviour of asset prices. In
this case, even the sign of a pre-emptive action is not clear-cut. Assuming that an asset price
bubble is fuelled by cuts in the interest rate, two responses are conceivable: the interest rate can be
kept lower than otherwise to fend off the deﬂationary effects of the bubble bursting tomorrow; or,
if there is no certainty that the bubble bursts tomorrow, an increase in interest rate may be deemed
necessary to prevent the bubble from growing further and, therefore, causing greater damage
further down the road.
The literature on monetary policy has produced a number of papers that deals with the issue of
whether simple rules should include asset prices or asset price misalignments, but has
unfortunately been relatively silent about the more general question of how policy should
optimally react to asymmetric or one-sided risk. Al Nowaihi and Stracca (2003) provide a general
discussion of optimal monetary policy in response to exogenous asymmetric shocks, when the
policymaker’s behaviour is affected by the types of cognitive biases commonly considered in the
behavioural ﬁnance literature. More recently, Svensson (2003) investigates, in a simple model,
how low-probability extreme events should be responded to under various types of loss functions,
w h i c hh a v eb e e np r o p o s e db yv a r i o u sa u t h o r sa s a realistic description of central bankers’
preferences.(3) In the present paper we also tackle the issue, but from a different angle. We
maintain the assumption of a quadratic loss and focus, instead, on incorporating the possibility of
regime shifts in the policymaker’s model. Allowing for regime shifts is a general and convenient
way to model the risks of a sudden change in economic behaviour, whether this involves changes
in the model parameters, the model structure or the properties of the exogenous shocks. More
precisely, we propose an optimal control problem in which the constraint is a Markov
regime-switching vector autoregression (with any ﬁnite number of regimes), rather than a
(3) Under a quadratic loss the weight given to the extreme event is, ceteris paribus, equal to its probability. Under
some simplifying assumptions, other loss functions - combined quadratic/absolute deviations, absolute deviation,
combined quadratic/constant, and perfectionist - imply, in decreasing order, a lower weight on the extreme event.
6stationary vector autoregression. Providing a simple algorithm that solves this problem, which
extends the standard linear regulator problem, is the ﬁrst contribution of this paper. To the best of
the author’s knowledge, this algorithm and its application (to be discussed below) are new in the
economic literature. One of its advantages is its relative simplicity: the problem solved by the
policymaker is effectively non-linear/quadratic but maintains all the advantages of the linear
quadratic framework.
The second contribution of this paper is to analyse optimal monetary policy in the context of a
stylised small open economy model, in which the real exchange rate is assumed to alternate
between enduring booms (or bubbles) and sudden corrections (busts) towards equilibrium.
Optimal policy is ‘asymmetric’ or non linear in the sense that it generally responds to the state of
the economy (e.g. inﬂation, output, etc.) in a different way depending on whether the economy is
experiencing a bubble or not. Optimal policy is also affected by the uncertainty about future
regime shifts, that is whether there will be a bubble or not. The recent literature on monetary
policy and asset prices - e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (2000,2001), Cecchetti et al. (2000,2003),
Batini and Nelson (2000), Filardo (2001) - look at whether simple rules should give weight to
asset prices, usually over and above their predictive power for inﬂation and output. These papers
derive their conclusions mainly from simulating some model under different time-invariant
reaction functions (optimised or not) and ranking them according to the computed losses. By
contrast, the current paper computes a regime-dependent (and hence time-variant) policy rule as
the solution of an optimal control problem.
Before moving to the description of the application, it is worth noticing that the approach
presented in this paper can be regarded as one of at least two ways of dealing with model
uncertainty. One option is to think that there exist a number of possible candidate models that can
be the true model at any given time, for the empirical evidence is typically consistent with more
than one theory or model speciﬁcation. A bayesian policymaker assigns a probability to each
model and then works out the optimal policy by averaging across different models in every period.
A more sophisticated version of this approach is for the policymaker to learn from any recent
observations about the likelihood of each model and to adjust their probabilities accordingly.(4)
The approach adopted in this paper is related but different. The policymaker believes that her
model is a good approximation of available data today, but that it might not necessarily continue to
(4) For recent applications of Bayesian model averaging see Brock et al. (2003), Cogley and Sargent (2003), and
Milani (2003).
7be a valid approximation tomorrow. Hence, the policymaker takes into account the possibility that
t o m o r r o wt h ee c o n o m yc a nb eg o v e r n e db yd i f ferent candidate models. For example, MPC
members could be worried that the behaviour of the exchange rate (e.g. mean, persistence,
sensitivity to interest rate, etc.) as well as its relationship with other endogenous variables in the
model (e.g. the degree of pass-through) could change radically.(5) Furthermore, in each period the
policymaker is assumed - unlike in the model averaging approach - to observe the current regime,
and therefore her uncertainty is always about how the model will evolve in the subsequent
period.(6)
The application is based on the small open economy model of Ball (1999). Ball’s framework is
modiﬁed to incorporate a boom-bust cycle in the exchange rate by assuming that the economy
alternates randomly between two regimes: the ‘bubble’ regime, in which the exchange rate
diverges increasingly from its long-run equilibrium (if not held in check by policy); and the ‘no
bubble’ or ‘normal’ regime, in which the exchange rate ﬂuctuates, in a stationary way, around its
long-run equilibrium. The evolution over time of these two regimes is described by a Markov
chain so that the times at which the boom begins and abruptly ends are stochastic.(7) Moreover,
the size of the correction in the exchange rate, which occurs when the economy switches from the
‘bubble’ to the ‘no-bubble’ regime, is endogenous, for it depends on the lagged exchange rate as
well as the policy instrument (and shocks).
A number of results emerge from the analysis. The ﬁrst main result is that, while optimal policy in
principle responds to all state variables, including the asset price, the optimal reaction to the
exchange rate is not robust to different assumptions about its own behaviour, and may also
signiﬁcantly differ between the ‘bubble’ and the ‘no-bubble’ regimes. By contrast, the optimal
weights that the policymaker should put on output and inﬂation do not, according to our numerical
analysis, differ markedly between the two regimes (although they do in principle).
Examining this result in more detail reveals that the optimal response to the exchange rate is
(5) One of the reasons that could cause parameters to drift is a change in the way private agents’ expectations are
formed, especially as a result of an unusual changes in the economic environment. Allowing for regime shifts in the
structural equations describing private sector’s behaviour can be seen as one way of mitigating the Lucas critique.
(6) This is a plausible assumption in some circumstances (e.g. an asset price collapse can be observed), but not in all
(e.g. permanent improvement in productivity is not visible unless with several years delay). Extending the current
solution algorithm to incorporate the possibility of a hidden state should be feasible but not straightforward. It would
involve solving a non linear ﬁltering problem together with the maximisation problem. This is left to future research.
(7) Note that the bubble can restart after bursting.
8highly dependent on the probability of the bubble bursting (indicated with p) and the probability
of the bubble emerging (indicated with q). Indeed, the optimal response often switches from
p o s i t i v et on e g a t i v ea n dv i c ev e r s a . I nt h e‘ b u b b l e ’ regime, it is optimal to pre-empt a future crash
if p exceeds a cut-off value (p∗) (i.e. if it is relatively likely that the bubble will collapse
tomorrow).(8) By contrast if p < p∗ (i.e. if the bubble is relatively unlikely to burst tomorrow), it
is optimal to lean against the bubble by responding negatively (positively) to an appreciation
(depreciation). If p = p∗, then optimal policy involves no response to the asset price. Likewise,
in the ‘no-bubble’ regime, if q exceeds a cut-off value (q∗) (i.e. if it is relatively likely that a
bubble is about to develop), then optimal policy counters any shock that could develop into a
prolonged future bubble by responding negatively (positively) to an appreciation (depreciation).
But if q < q∗, then optimal policy responds positively (negatively) when the currency appreciates
(depreciates) to offset the impact on inﬂation of shocks that are relatively likely to be of transitory
nature. Again, optimal policy does not respond to the asset price when q = q∗. The cut-off values
of the probabilities, p∗ and q∗, are found in the numerical analysis to depend on the relative
weight on output in the policymaker’s loss function. In particular, p∗ t e n d st ob e‘ l o w ’( i . e .l e s s
than 0.5) under strict inﬂation targeting and to rise with the relative loss weight.(9)
A further interesting result is the fact that policy becomes more cautious when there is uncertainty
about whether or not there is a bubble, with cautiousness increasing with the ‘strength’ of the
bubble (i.e. the rate at which past asset prices translate into current asset prices). The degree of
cautiousness is usually strongest for intermediate values of the probabilities. This reﬂe c t saf o r m
of Brainard (1967) uncertainty.
Finally, a key result of the paper concerns the selection of the transition probabilities (p and q)
which, as we have seen, critically affect the optimal response to the asset price. Given the
difﬁculty involved in identifying bubbles and the fact that previous episodes may contain little
information about current and future episodes, the policymaker may be highly uncertain about
these probabilities. For this reason, we also compute the relative costs of policy mistakes, namely
the cost involved in selecting the wrong probabilities, under different scenarios. We normally ﬁnd
that the robust (minmax) value of the probability is close to a half. This means that if a
(8) This involves keeping interest rates higher (lower), ceteris paribus, to offset the future inﬂationary (deﬂationary)
impact of a currency depreciation (appreciation).
(9) p∗ and q∗ are approximately 1/2 when the policymaker’s loss function attaches equal weight to output and
inﬂation.
9policymaker has a strong preference for an early resolution of uncertainty, she would attach
approximately equal probability to being in a ‘bubble’ or being in a ‘normal’ regime. For bubbles
of longer expected duration (i.e. ﬁve years), the minmax value tends to become smaller (around
25%). More interestingly, we ﬁnd that overestimating the probability of an incipient bubble can
be signiﬁcantly more costly than underestimating it under most scenarios.
It is important to notice that the application provides some useful insights, but abstracts from the
possible existence of more than one asset price misalignment, which in practice considerably
complicates actual policy making. For instance, while, according to some commentators, the UK
apparently had an overvalued exchange rate in the late 1990s, suggesting lower interest rates to
lean against it, it has also had rapidly rising house prices, which might have suggested the opposite
response.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the optimal control problem with structural
or regime shifts, and Section 3 illustrates how to compute its solution. Section 4 describes the
model used in the application. Section 5 analyses the sensitivity of the optimal interest rate to the
model’s state variables, namely output, inﬂation and lagged exchange rate. Section 6 performs a
robustness analysis on the choice of the probabilities. Section 7 concludes.
2 The optimal control problem with regime shifts





tr (xt,ut) β ∈ (0,1)
subject to x0, s0 given, and the following model of the economy
xt+1 = A(st+1)xt + B (st+1)ut + εt+1 t ≥ 0 (1)
where r (x,u) is the period loss, β is the discount factor, x is the n × 1v e c t o ro fs t a t ev a r i a b l e s ,u
is the m × 1v e c t o ro fc o n t r o lv a r i a b l e sa n dε is the n × 1 vector of mean-zero shocks with
variance-covariance matrix  ε. The matrices A and B are stochastic and take on different values
depending on the regime or state of the world st ∈ {1,..., N}.T h e r e g i m e st, which is observable
(10)An introduction to dynamic programming and the optimal linear regulator problem can be found in Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2000), Ch. 2-4.






in which pij = prob{st+1 = j|st = i} is the probability of moving from state i to state j at t + 1;
and
 N
j=1 pij = 1, i = 1,..., N. These probabilities are assumed to be time-invariant and
exogenous. The formulation (1) is general enough to capture different types of jumps or extreme
changes in the economic system.
Note that the above control problem boils down to N separate optimal control problems (with
generic period loss r (·))w h e nP = IN (N-dimensional identity matrix), each corresponding to a
different regime. Obviously, the above problem also reduces to a unique one in the case in which
the matrices Ai and Bi (i = 1,..., N) are identical, regardless of P.
3S o l u t i o n
Solving the problem means ﬁnding a state-contingent decision rule, that is a rule which tells how
to set the control ut as a function of the current vector of state variables, xt, and the current regime
st.(13) Associated with each state of the world is a Bellman equation. Therefore, solving the
model requires jointly solving the following set of intertwined N Bellman equations:
v (xt,i) = max
ut
 










i = 1,..., N (3)
where v (xt,i) is the continuation value of the optimal dynamic programming problem at t written
as a function of the state variables xt as well as the state of the world at t, st = i; Eε
t is the






= 0. The policymaker has to ﬁnd a sequence {ut}
∞
t=0 which maximises her
current payoff r (·) as well as the discounted sum of all future payoffs. The latter is the expected
continuation value of the dynamic programming problem and is obtained as the average of all
possible continuation values at time t + 1 weighted by the transition probabilities (2).G i v e n t h e
(11)This means that the uncertainty faced by the policymaker is about where the system will be at t+1, t+2, and so
forth.
(12)For an introduction to Markov chain and regime switching vector autoregressive models see e.g. Hamilton (1994).
(13)Henceforth, regime or state of the world will be used interchangeably.
11inﬁnite horizon of the problem, the continuation values (conditioned on a particular regime) have
the same functional forms.
In principle, one could solve the above problem for the case in which r (·) is not a quadratic form.
Techniques for discretising the state space or approximating the Bellman equations could be used
for this purpose (see e.g. Judd, 1998). However, these techniques can easily run into the ‘curse of
dimensionality’, thereby limiting the size of the state and control spaces to an unsatisfactory
number of variables. We therefore prefer to proceed under the assumption that r is a quadratic
form:





where R is a n × n positive deﬁnite matrix and Q is m × m positive semi-deﬁnite matrix. Given
the linear-quadratic nature of the problem, let us assume that
v (xt,i) = x
 
tVixt + di i = 1,.., N (5)
where Vi is a n × n symmetric positive-semideﬁnite matrix, and di is a scalar. Both are
undetermined. To ﬁnd them, we substitute (5) into the Bellman equations (3) (after using (4) and
(5)) and compute the ﬁrst-order conditions, which give the following set of decision rules:
u (xt,i) =− Fi · xt i = 1,.., N (6)
where the set of Fi depend on the unknown matrices Vi, i = 1,..,N. By substituting these
decision rules back into the Bellman equations (3), and equating the terms in the quadratic forms,
we ﬁnd a set of interrelated Riccati equations, which can be solved for Vi (i = 1,.., N) by
iterating jointly on them, that is
[V1...VN] = T ([V1... VN]) (7)
The set of interrelated Riccati equations deﬁnes a contraction T over V1,...,VN,t h eﬁxed point of
which, T (·), is the solution being sought. After lengthy matrix algebra, the resulting system of
Riccati equations can be written in compact form as:





































where X ≡ A, B; Y ≡ A, B. Written in this form the Riccati equations contain ‘averages’ of
different ‘matrix composites’ conditional on a given state i.














i = 1,.., N (9)
Solving for the constant terms in the Bellman equations (3) - after substitution of (6) -g i v e s
(IN − βP)d = βP . The vector of scalars d = [d]i=1,...,N (N × 1 vector) in the value functions
(5) is given by
d = (IN − βP)
−1 βP  (10)
where   = [tr(Vi ε)]i=1,...,N (N × 1 vector).(14) (15)
The decision rules (6) depend on the uncertainty about which state of the world will prevail in the
future, as reﬂected in the transition probabilities (2). Yet, the response coefﬁcients (i.e. the entries
in Fi) do not depend on the variance-covariance matrix  ε of the zero-mean shock ε in (1).T h u s ,
with respect to ε certainty equivalence holds in that the policy rules (6) are identical to the ones
obtained by assuming that within each regime the system behaves in a completely deterministic
fashion. The noise statistics, as is clear from (10), affect the objective function.
It is interesting to note that the above solutions incorporate the standard linear regulator solutions
as two special cases. First, by setting the transition matrix P = IN (i.e. N-dimensional identity
matrix), one obtains the solution of N separate linear regulator problems, each corresponding to a
different regime on the assumption that each regime will last forever (and no switching to other
regimes occurs). This case could be useful as a benchmark to see how the uncertainty about
moving from one regime to another impacts on the state-contingent rule. In other words, by
setting P = IN, we are computing a set of rules which will differ from ones computed with
P  = IN, in that the latter will be affected by the chance of switching to another regime. Second,
by choosing identical matrices (i.e. Ai = A, Bi = B), the solution obtained is trivially that of a
standard linear regulator problem with a time-invariant law of transition.(16)
(14)We assume that (IN − βP) is invertible. Given that P is a stochastic matrix, a necessary condition for its
invertibility is that β<1. If (IN − βP) is not invertible, other methods can be used to ﬁnd the solution d.















= I, then the covariance matrix of the white-noise additive shocks would be
  (st) = C (st)C (st)  or, to simplify notation,  i = CiC 
i (i = 1,.., N). The introduction of a state-contingent
variance for the noise process does not affect the decision rules ut =−Fixt but affects the value functions through  
in (10):   = [tr(Vi i)]i=1,...,N.
(16)In this case (9) boils down to
F =
 
Q + βB VB
 −1 βB VA
134 Exchange rate booms and busts in a stylised small open economy model.
In this section we consider Ball’s model (1999) of a small open economy. The model is meant to
capture the main effects of monetary policy in the simplest possible way. It consists of three
equations:
yt+1 = αyt − β (it − πt) − χat + ηt+1 (11)
πt+1 = δπt + γ yt − f (at − at−1) + εt+1 (12)
at = θ (it − πt) + vt (13)
(11) is an open economy IS equation in which the real interest rate i − π and the real exchange
rate a affects the output gap y with one period delay.(17) An increase in a is an appreciation of the
domestic currency and, therefore, tends to depress spending on domestic goods. η is a white noise
s h o c kw i t hv a r i a n c eσ2
η. (12) is an open economy Phillips curve, in which the output gap as well as
the change in the real exchange rate affects inﬂation with one period lag. With δ = 1, the Phillips
curve is an accelerationist one, the assumption we make throughout. ε i saw h i t en o i s es h o c kw i t h
variance σ2
ε. (13) is a reduced-form equation that relates the real exchange rate to the current level
of the real interest rate and a transitory shock v. The positive sign of θ captures the idea that a rise
in the real interest rate makes domestic assets more attractive relative to foreign ones, leading,
other things equal, to an appreciation. The white-noise shock v,w i t hv a r i a n c eσ2
v,r e ﬂects all
other factors (future expectations, foreign interest rate, etc.) that can inﬂuence the exchange rate.
The use of the reduced-form (13) in place of the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition can be
realistically justiﬁed with the empirical failure of the latter. As stressed e.g. Batini and Nelson
(2000) (see also references cited therein) , there are two responses to this failure. One is to assume
that deviations from UIP takes the form of a structural shock, which can be thought of as a
time-varying risk premium. The other is to replace the UIP with a reduced form equation which is
where V is the solution to the single Riccati equation
V = R + βA VA− β2A VB
 
Q + βB VB
 −1 B VA
and (10) boils down to the constant
d = (1 − β)−1 β · tr(V ε)
See e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2002), pp. 56-58.
(17)All variables are in logs except i and π, and are expressed as deviations from its long-run equilibria.
14a good empirical approximation of the actual exchange rate behaviour.(18) In this sense, assuming
a reduced form linking the exchange rate to interest rates is not unrealistic or unreasonable,
especially if one makes the assumption – as we will do below – that this relationship is not stable
but can change over time or across regimes.
In our application we replace (13) with:
at = ρ (st+1)at−1 + θ (st+1)(it − πt) + vt (14)
where the term ρa is an ad-hoc, but not unrealistic way, of capturing a bubble-like behaviour, that
is the fact that the exchange rate can grow out of line of its long-run equilibrium, whatever the
underlying factors. More precisely, (14) is modelled as a regime-switching autoregression, in
which the autoregressive coefﬁcient ρ (st+1) takes on different values depending on the regime in
which the system is:
ρ (st+1) > 1i f st+1 = 1
= 0i f st+1 = 2
We assume there are two regimes: in one regime (indicated with s = 1) ρ (1) > 1, that is the
exchange rate tends to grow away from its long-run equilibrium value (assuming an unchanged
real interest rate and no shock); in the other regime (indicated with s = 2), ρ (2) = 0, that is the
exchange rate behaviour abruptly collapses towards its long-run equilibrium (again assuming that
the real interest rate is also at its long-run equilibrium and that there is no shock). Likewise, (14)
also allows for the possibility that policy can have a different contemporaneous impact on the
exchange rate depending on the regime in which the system is (i.e. θ is contingent on st+1).(19) The




q 1 − q


where p = Pr{st+1 = 2|st = 1} and q = Pr{st+1 = 1|st = 2}, (t = 0,1,2,.....). Hence, p is the
probability that the bubble crashes when one exists and q is the probability that a new bubble
starts. Note the timing of the bubble and of the policy decision. At the time policy is chosen the
policymaker knows st, but not st+1. Therefore, we assume that the state of the asset price during
period t is revealed only towards the end of it, after policy has been decided. This assumption is
meant to capture, realistically, the uncertainty about the bubble faced by the policymaker.
(18)Wadhwani (1999) discusses an empirical model of the exchange rate for the UK. Beechey et al. (2000) provides a
model of Australia. Both models are similar to the reduced form adopted in Ball (1999).
(19)More generally, other structural parameters could change across regimes. For example, following a large
depreciation of the exchange rate, the Phillips curve could become steeper. The algorithm described in Section 2
allow to compute optimal policies for these scenarios.
15The above speciﬁcation captures the existence of a bubble or misalignment and should be thought
of as reﬂecting the existence of various phenomena that can cause the exchange rate to grow out of
line from its long-run equilibrium. In other words, it does not reﬂect any particular deﬁnition of
bubble or theory, but the bubble-like behaviour common to several theories or models.(20) Indeed,
there is no consensus in the literature on the deﬁnition of a bubble and its underlying causes.(21)
Bubbles may be rational and unrelated to fundamentals (e.g. Blanchard and Watson, 1982). A
reason for holding an asset even if the price is above that suggested by fundamentals is that there
is a chance that it will continue to rise, generating an expected capital gain that compensate the
asset holder for the risk of a price collapse. Froot and Obstfeld (1991) argue that rational bubbles
may be intrinsic, that is reﬂecting the excessive reaction of market participants to fundamentals.
Thus, persistent changes in fundamentals could le a da na s s e tp r i c et ob ep e r s i s t e n t l yo v e r -o r
under-valued. However, bubbles do not have to rely only on self-fulﬁlling expectations: they may
arise from manias or irrational exuberance (Kindleberg, 1978; Minsky, 1982; Shiller, 2000). They
may reﬂect expectations of future higher productivity or earnings, often associated with important
technological innovations; when these expectations are subsequently disappointed, asset prices
collapse.(22) More recently, De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2003a, 2003b) have shown that, when
market participants use different trading rules and transaction costs are important, exchange rates
can alternate between periods in which they tightly follow fundamentals and periods in which they
appear to be ‘disconnected’ and more related to their own past values, a feature conﬁrmed by the
empirical evidence cited by the authors.(23)
The rest of the model is standard. The policymaker is assumed to minimise the following












where φ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, and λ is the penalty on output stabilisation. It is important
(20)The ‘bubble interpretation’ is not the only possible one. An alternative could be to assume 0 <ρ(1) < 1a n d
ρ (2) = 0. In this case the shock is either a stationary but persistent one, reﬂecting the inﬂuences of short- or
medium-term factors not explicitly captured by the stylised model, or a purely transitory one. Accordingly, the
uncertainty faced by the policymaker would be about whether any observed shock to the exchange rate is going to
persist for some time or to vanish after just one period.
(21)See Filardo (2003) for an interesting discussion of macroeconomic bubbles and their implications for monetary
policy.
(22)As suggested e.g. by Meltzer (2003), alternative explanations to rational and irrational bubbles can be formulated
by assuming that agents have only imperfect knowledge of the underlying fundamentals and face Knigthian
uncertainty rather than ‘well-behaved’ probability distributions.
(23)The use of simple trading rules represents the agents’ rational response to their own limited ability to process
information. Because agents are rational, the relative use of these rules amongst agents varies over time reﬂecting
how well they do in terms of risk-adjusted proﬁt.
16to note that the policymaker only targets output and inﬂation. As stressed by e.g. Bean (2003),
there is no need to specify a target for asset prices when the targeting rule is a statement about the
loss function.(24) However, the instrument rule - as will be shown below - is in principle a
function of all state variables, including the asset price, for the policymaker uses all available
information to forecast inﬂation and output. One could argue that optimal rules are difﬁcult to
implement in practise, because of the technical and political difﬁculties involved in forecasting for
all future periods, and difﬁcult to communicate if the model is more complex than the one
analysed here. Therefore, simple rules could provide useful guidance. The crucial question then
is not whether in principle one ought or not to include asset prices as an argument but which
weight the policymaker ought to put on them. Below, we will see that if the decision rule arising
from the control problem is interpreted as a rule of thumb, the choice of a ‘robust’ coefﬁcient on
the exchange rate couldb ep r o b l e m a t i c .
Given the simple dynamic structure of the model, a period is normally interpreted as a year. The
chosen parameterisation is summarised in Table A. The parameter α, β and γ are calibrated using
the estimated values found in Bean (1998). The equations are estimated individually using GLS
over the sample 1950-1996 (δ is kept ﬁx e di nt h ee s t i m a t i o n ) . T h ee s timates are similar to those
obtained with annual data for the Euro Area and the US in similar papers (e.g. Orphanides and
Wieland, 1999). The standard deviations of the demand and inﬂation shocks, ση and σε are also
taken from Bean (1998). These are not the actual standard errors of the estimation but those of the
Treasury forecasting record during the period 1985-92. The parameters describing the existence
of a foreign exchange rate channel, χ, f and θ, are taken from Ball (1999). We have chosen a
discount factor φ =.96 in accordance with annual data. The bottom of the table reports the
parameters chosen for the equation governing the exchange rate. In addition to θ,w h o s ev a l u ei s
the same as in Ball (1999), we calibrate the existence of a bubble by assuming that the exchange
grows by a rate comprised between 10 and 30 percent a year (in the absence of any shock and any
offsetting policy action). The choice of σv is somewhat arbitrary but probably not implausible.
As illustrated by Ball (1999), a key feature of the above model is the fact that the exchange rate
affects inﬂation directly through the costs of imported inputs, and indirectly through the effect on
demand. The import price channel operates with one period lag, while the output channel takes
two periods: one period to affect output, and an additional period for output to affect inﬂation
(24)In the terminology of Svensson (e.g. 2002) the loss (15) is a general targeting rule. For a deﬁnition of instrument
rule, see ibidem.
17Bean (1998) loss
α .72 φ .96





Ball (1999) exchange rate
χ .2 θ(1) = θ(2) 2
f .2 ρ(1) [1.1,1.3]
θ 2 ρ(2) 0
σv .05
Table A: Parameters for the small open economy
through the Phillips curve. Ball shows how the existence of an exchange rate channel requires
policy to respond not only to output and inﬂation, as prescribed by the simple version of the
Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) but also to the lagged level of the real exchange rate. More precisely,
the optimal response is positive, requiring a rise in the interest rate when the lagged exchange rate
has appreciated. A simple Taylor rule, not augmented with the exchange rate, is generally
suboptimal when the economy is described by (11)-(13). The intuition of this result can be
explained as follows. For simplicity, assume that the policymaker is targeting inﬂa t i o no n l y( i . e .
λ=0 in (15)). In Ball’s model, shocks to the real exchange rate are transitory. An appreciation at
time t causes inﬂation and output to fall at t+1, the time at which the appreciation is reversed. If
the policymaker behaves as predicted by a simple Taylor rule, thus ignoring the exchange rate, she
would cut the interest rate. As a result, policy would have a positive impact on inﬂation in t+2
through the import price channel, and a further positive impact in t+3 through the output channel.
By ignoring the transitory nature of the shocks to the exchange rate, policy would then cause
excessive and suboptimal ﬂuctuations in inﬂation. By contrast, a positive response to a lagged
appreciation would tend to reduce the response of policy to the observed current change in
inﬂation. Equivalently, optimal policy in his model involves targeting a measure of long-run
inﬂation, which ﬁlters out any transitory variations due to the exchange rate.
In Ball (1999) optimal policy is computed and analysed with reference to a time-invariant model
in which there is no parameters uncertainty. A general criticism levelled against Ball’s analysis is
18that the policymaker fails to take into account (at least) some of the uncertainties that real-world
policymakers face, and even though the model can be regarded as a good approximation, it may
turn out to be inadequate in some aspects tomorrow (e.g. Sargent, 1999). In particular, in Ball’s
model the shock to the real exchange rate is known by the policymaker to be transitory. This is
probably critical to the ﬁnding that a modiﬁed Taylor rule should incorporate a role for the real
exchange rate and that the sign of the response should be positive. But the behaviour of the
exchange rate is certainly one of the most uncertain structural feature of (11)-(13).
By contrast, in the model considered here, there is uncertainty about the nature of a given change
in the real exchange rate: this can be either a transitory shock or the inception of a bubble. How
does this uncertainty alter the above conclusions about the optimal response to the exchange rate?
And, if there is a bubble, how should the policymaker deal with it? Leaning against the bubble is
one possibility, which involves keeping the interest rate lower than warranted by the current levels
of output and inﬂation, in order to limit the growth of the bubble and, consequently, the
detrimental effects of its possible crash going forward. On the other hand, the prospect of an
immediate crash calls for a rise in the interest rate today in order to offset the inﬂationary
consequences of a large fall tomorrow. Clearly, the optimal policy must depend on the probability
q that a bubble is emerging as well as its average duration, as reﬂe c t e di nt h ep r o b a b i l i t yp of the
bubble collapsing. Unfortunately, these probabilities can be difﬁcult to assess. The policymaker
can end up making serious mistakes whatever her decision. If she leans against the bubble and the
bubble bursts, policy would be too loose to counter its inﬂationary effects. By contrast, if the
policymaker is bracing for a crash and this does not occur, her policy would be too tight and could
further fuel the bubble, with even more unpleasant consequences further ahead. Below we set out
to investigate how policy should respond in the presence of a bubble like the one in (14).I n
Section 6 we examine how the wrong choice of the probabilities affects the policymaker’s loss.
5 Analysis of optimal policy responses
Optimal policy is computed using the algorithm described in Section 2 after casting (11), (12) and
(14) in matrix form. This requires setting β ≡ φ (discount factor in (15)), x = [y,π,a−1] ,
u = [i],a n dε = [η,ε,v]  in (1) and (4), and constructing the matrices A, B, Q,a n dR
accordingly. The solution gives the following optimal decision rule:
it = fy (st) yt + fπ (st)πt + fa (st)at−1 (16)
19There are two notable aspects. First, the optimal rule depends on all state variables. Therefore, a
simple Taylor rule, in which the interest rate responds only to output and inﬂation, is generally
suboptimal. In practice, whether the asset price is given a large or small weight depends on the
particular model at hand. We will return on this below. Second, the optimal response coefﬁcients
generally take different values in different states of the world. This means that the optimal
response is not invariant but must adapt to the changing circumstances. Clearly, a state-contingent
rule may no longer be simple and many of the advantages (mainly transparency) of a simple rule
could then be lost. This can help explain why, in the face of the considerable degree of
uncertainty involved in assessing the existence and impact of asset price bubbles - besides of
course other reasons - a policymaker might not want to commit to, or be seen as following the
prescriptions of a simple decision rule. Below we set out to investigate the sensitivity of the
optimal interest rate to the properties of (16) under different scenarios about the characteristics of
the bubble, namely its size and its transition probabilities.
Table B reports the optimal response coefﬁcients in (16). The left-upper part shows the optimal
response coefﬁcients in the absence of the bubble, that is when (14) holds, for different values of
the weight on output stabilisation in (15). In the case of strict inﬂation targeting, λ = 0, policy
responds more aggressively to all variables. As the loss places more weight on output
stabilisation, the responses decrease. In particular, the response to inﬂa t i o na sw e l la st h ep o s i t i v e
response to a lagged exchange rate appreciation is much less strong . These responses are
compared with those implied by the explicit consideration of a bubble or non-linear behaviour in
the exchange rate. The table reports only the coefﬁcients computed for λ = 1. On the left
hand-side of the table are the response coefﬁcients for a bubble that grows ten percent per period,
other things equal; on the right hand-side are the response coefﬁcients for a bubble that grows
thirty percent per period. Fore a c hp a i ro fp r o b a b i l i t i e s(q, p), we report the responses in both
states: the ‘bubble’ state (s=1) and the ‘normal’ state (s=2). For example, (.25,.5) indicates that
there is a 25% probability that a bubble with an expected duration of two periods can emerge (the
expected duration of a bubble being 1/p).
There are a number of qualitative features that emerge from the inspection of Table B. We begin
by examining the responses to output and inﬂation separately from those to the real exchange rate.
First, the responses to output and inﬂation are generally smaller relative to the case in which there
is no bubble uncertainty. Second, policy attenuation is generally stronger, other things equal, the
20greater the growth rate of the bubble (as can be seen by comparing the left-hand side to the
right-hand side of the table). Both ﬁndings have the interesting implication that policy should
respond less not only when there is a switch between regimes but also when the economy is hit by
ordinary shocks to demand and inﬂation. Third, the responses to output and inﬂation are very
similar in the ‘bubble state’ and the ‘normal state’ in most cases. This means that most of the time
when the economy moves from one state to the other, a failure by the policymaker to adjust policy
to the new circumstances, bar the treatment of the asset price, should cause relatively minor losses.
By contrast, the size and the sign of the respons e st ot h ee x c h a n g er a t ev a r yg r e a t l yw i t ht h e
transition probabilities as well as the state of the world. In particular, the coefﬁcients generally
decrease with the probability of a bubble emerging q and with its average duration (1/p).L e t ’ s
look ﬁr s ta tt h ee f f e c t so fp on a−1. Normally, the higher p (the lower 1/p), the greater the
positive response to an appreciation when the system is in a ‘bubble state’. For p=.75, the
responses are the closest to the ones that would prevail in a stationary, no bubble world, as the
policymaker is anticipating the inﬂationary (deﬂationary) effects of a fall (rise) in the exchange
rate. However, the response in the ‘bubble state’ becomes almost negligible when p=.5 and
slightly negative when p=.33, for ρ(1) = 1.1; a bubble that grows faster tends to make these
ﬁg u r e ss l i g h t l ym o r en e g a t i v e( a sc a nb es e e nb yl ooking at the left-hand side of the table). Note
that, the responses in the bubble state are remarkably similar across different values of q.I no t h e r
words, they appear to depend only on the expected duration of the bubble. The same values
becomes smaller and more negative when the bubble grow faster (ρ(1)=1.3), but again the values
are remarkably similar for different values of q. Overall, for bubble of expected duration of two
or more periods the coefﬁcients appear to be quite small and bi a s e dt o w a r d san e g a t i v er e s p o n s e ,
which corresponds to a policy of (gently) leaning against the bubble.
As to the effects of q on a−1, the response to the exchange rate is positive for low values of the
probability, and becomes negative as the probability rises. Unlike in the bubble state, the response
to the exchange rate in the normal state is positive for low probability q, close to zero for
probability of around 50%, and negative for high probability q. The responses are remarkably
similar across bubbles of different expected duration. In other words, they do not seem to depend
on p. When a bubble is not likely, the responses are closer to the ones that would prevail in a no
bubble world, though they are attenuated. When a bubble is likely, the responses are negative,
indicating that the adequate response to an exchange rate shock is opposite to the one required by
21a transitory shock. In this case the policymaker wants to limit the bubble from its inception.
However, for intermediate probabilities, which reﬂects the highest degree of uncertainty about the
nature of an exchange rate disturbance, the policymaker does not attach any weight to the
exchange rate. A fast growing bubble (ρ(2)=1.3) changes the picture slightly in that the responses
become smaller and more negative.
To sum up, policy is more cautious in responding to output and inﬂation when the economy
alternates between normal periods and period of inﬂating bubbles, compared to an economy in
which bubbles never emerge. This also means that policy responds more cautiously to ordinary
shocks to demand and inﬂation, not only to shocks to the exchange rate. The response to the
exchange rate, instead, is highly dependent, perhaps unsurprisingly, on the stochastic properties of
the bubble.
There is not much more that can be said about the optimal response coefﬁcients by looking only at
Table B. We resort to a graphical illustration to see if more can be learnt. Figures 1-3 show the
contour lines for the optimal response coefﬁcients in the decision rule (16). The vertical axes
indicate the probability p of a bubble bursting assuming one exists; the vertical axes indicate the
probability q of moving into a bubble. The columns correspond to different coefﬁcients (in order
fy, fπ, fa); the rows correspond to different states of the world (the bubble state is in the upper
part; the normal state is in the lower part). Each ﬁgure refers to a different weight λ on output
stabilisation in the loss (15), and they all refer to a bubble growing 20% a year (ceteris paribus).
We initially focus on the sensitivity of policy to output and inﬂation. Chart 1 corresponds to strict
inﬂation targeting λ = 0. The ﬁrst thing that one notices is that as both the probabilities q and p
rise, there is an initial attenuation of responses to output and, more strongly, to inﬂation, in both
states of the world, which tends to disappear as these probabilities both continue to rise. Indeed,
the locus where policy is the most cautious is where the probabilities of moving into one regime or
remaining in the other are more or less equally balanced. In the normal state, there is a steep
decrease of the inﬂation coefﬁcient as q rises. For bubble expected to last for about two periods
(p=.5) the decline in the coefﬁcient is much steeper as q rises towards .5 but then increases more
gently after that. When the system is in a bubble state, the coefﬁcient on inﬂation declines steeply
for low values of the probability p and appears to ﬂatten as the probability further rises.
22qp y π a−1 y π a−1
λ =0 0 0 s=2 1.23 3.50 .50
1 s=2 1.16 1.88 .18
3 s=2 1.06 1.55 .11
ρ (1)=1.1 ρ (1)=1.3
λ =1 .25 .75 s=1 1.08 1.83 .09 s=1 1.05 1.80 .07
s = 21 . 0 81 . 8 3 . 0 9 s = 21 . 0 51 . 8 0 . 0 7
. 5 0. 7 5 s = 11 . 0 61 . 8 2 . 0 9 s = 11 . 0 11 . 7 8 . 0 6
s = 21 . 0 71 . 8 2 . 0 1 s = 21 . 0 21 . 7 8- . 0 3
. 7 5. 7 5 s = 11 . 0 91 . 8 5 . 0 9 s = 11 . 0 51 . 8 2 . 0 7
s=2 1.08 1.82 -.07 s=2 1.04 1.79 -.13
1. 7 5 s = 11 . 1 61 . 9 2 . 1 1 s = 11 . 1 51 . 9 2 . 0 9
s=2 1.06 1.79 -.16 s=2 1.03 1.75 -.23
. 2 5. 5 0 s = 11 . 0 71 . 8 2 0 s = 11 . 0 31 . 7 9- . 0 4
s = 21 . 0 81 . 8 2 . 0 8 s = 21 . 0 31 . 7 9 . 0 6
. 5 0. 5 0 s = 11 . 0 51 . 8 1 0 s = 11 . 0 01 . 7 7- . 0 4
s = 21 . 0 51 . 8 1 0 s = 21 . 0 01 . 7 7- . 0 4
. 7 5. 5 0 s = 11 . 0 71 . 8 3 . 0 1 s = 11 . 0 31 . 8 0- . 0 4
s=2 1.06 1.82 -.08 s=2 1.02 1.78 -.14
1. 5 0 s = 11 . 1 21 . 8 8 . 0 2 s = 11 . 1 01 . 8 7- . 0 2
s=2 1.05 1.80 -.16 s=2 1.01 1.77 -.23
.25 .33 s=1 1.07 1.83 -.05 s=1 1.03 1.80 -.10
s = 21 . 0 71 . 8 2 . 0 8 s = 21 . 0 31 . 7 9 . 0 6
.50 .33 s=1 1.05 1.82 -.05 s=1 1.00 1.78 -.10
s = 21 . 0 51 . 8 2 0 s = 21 . 0 01 . 7 8- . 0 4
.75 .33 s=1 1.07 1.83 -.05 s=1 1.02 1.80 -.10
s=2 1.06 1.83 -.07 s=2 1.02 1.80 -.13
1 .33 s=1 1.10 1.87 -.04 s=1 1.08 1.85 -.09
s=2 1.07 1.83 -.15 s=2 1.03 1.80 -.23
Table B: Optimal response coefﬁcients
23Under ﬂexible targeting (Figure 2), and in particular when equal weights are placed on output and
inﬂation stabilisation (i.e. λ = 1), the attenuation result described above is much more milder for
inﬂation but more noticeable for output. Both the coefﬁcients on output and inﬂation are quite
sensitive to initial rises in the probability q in the normal state, whereas they seem to be less
s e n s i t i v et oi n i t i a lr i s e so fb o t hp and q in the bubble state. As output versus inﬂation stabilisation
becomes more important (see e.g. Figure 3), the responses to inﬂation and output become very
insensitive to the transition probabilities in both states of the world.
We now turn our attention to the optimal response of policy to the real exchange rate. There are a
number of features that emerge from the joint examination of all the charts. First, the response
largely depends on: the probability p of the bubble collapsing if in the bubble state (top of the
ﬁgures); on the probability q of a new bubble forming if in the normal state (bottom). The
contour lines, however, are not completely ﬂat, meaning that in some cases both transition
probabilities matter, especially under strict inﬂation targeting (see Fig. 1).
Second, there is a cut-off value for the probabilities, at which the weight put on the exchange rate
is zero. As this value is crossed, the policy response switches sign. For example, consider the
bubble state in Chart 1 (the plot in the top-right corner). The cut-off value is around 30%. For
low probabilities of the bubble crashing (meaning a longer expected duration), the optimal
response consists in keeping the interest rate lower, ceteris paribus, in order to limit the bubble
growth. As the probability p crosses the cut-off point, the response becomes positive: policy
turns pre-emptive, that is the interest rate is kept higher (lower), ceteris paribus, in anticipation of
the inﬂationary (or deﬂationary) impact of a downward (upward) jump in the real exchange rate.
Now, imagine that the bubble has burst. Depending on p and q the weight on the exchange rate
normally jump to a different values and can even switch sign. For example, for low p and low q,
the weight will move from a negative to a positive one. The cut-off point for q in the normal state
is approximately between 70% and 80% (depending on p). Hence, unless the probabilities of a
bubble emerging next period are high, optimal policy will put a positive weight on the real
exchange rate, though less than in the case wh e r et h es h o c k sa r ep u r e l yt r a n s i t o r y .
An interesting aspect of this cut-off point, which emerge on examination of all ﬁgures, is that it
varies with the weight λ placed on output stabilisation: the cut-off point for p in the bubble state
tends to rise with λ, whereas the cut-off point for q in the normal state tends to fall with λ.T h e
24cut-off point for p raises from around 30% when λ=0 to just over 50% and to around 75% in the
bubble state when λ=1 and λ=5, respectively. The cut off for q falls from around 70-80% under
inﬂation targeting to about 50% and 25% when λ=1 and λ=5, respectively. Therefore, in the
bubble state an increasing concern for output stabilisation widens the range of probabilities for
which it is optimal to lean against the bubble, at the expense of the pre-emption motive. Likewise,
in the normal state an increasing concern for output stabilisation widens the range of probabilities
for which it is optimal to ‘take insurance’ against the inception of a bubble rather than offsetting a
transitory shock.
To sum up, whether a policymaker decides to lean against the bubble or not depends not only on
the probabilities of moving from one state to the other, but also on how ﬂexible is her inﬂation
targeting. A greater degree of ﬂexibility tends to make a negative r e s p o n s et oa na p p r e c i a t i o no f
the real exchange rate more ‘attractive’ in both states of the world, in the sense that this would be
the optimal thing to do for a wider range of probabilities.
Given the crucial importance of the transition probabilities in determining the optimal policy, the
next section sets out to investigate more closely how choosing the ‘wrong’ probabilities affect the
policymaker’s loss.
6 Robust selection of transition probabilities
The stochastic properties of the bubble are undisputedly the most uncertain ingredient in the
policy decision process, which of course requires a lot of judgement by the policymaker. Because
of the difﬁculties involved, the policymaker might be reluctant or, most likely, unable to specify a
single probability value. Instead, she would probably form an opinion about a probability interval,
w h o s el e n g t hw o u l db ear e ﬂection of her degree of uncertainty. The policymaker is effectively in
a world of Knightian uncertainty. How can she deal with it? And how can we reconcile this
uncertainty with an optimal control exercise which requires the assignment of unique values to
those probabilities? A heuristic way to deal with it, which is the one adopted here, is to analyse
how different decisions affect the policymaker’s loss under different scenarios.(25) In this regard,
the natural questions one can ask are: is there a decision which delivers relatively better outcomes
than others in most or all scenarios? Or, is there a decision which delivers a particularly bad
(25)For a formal approach to robustness in macroeconomics see Hansen and Sargent (2003).
25outcome in some cases, and which should perhaps be avoided (assuming the policymaker is not a
risk lover)? How asymmetric are the losses for a particular choice? To answer these questions,
we will carry out the following exercise. We assume that the policymaker, who does not know q,
chooses a probability ˆ q. For a given expected duration of the bubble, we then compute the losses




. W ew a n tt os e eh o wag i v e nc h o i c eˆ q, and hence the optimal
policy based on it, performs across different realisations of the true value of the probability q.
It is worth noticing that exercises similar to the one carried out here, we believe, may help to
inform the judgement of the policymaker in choosing the optimal policy in the face of uncertainty.
T h e r ei sn on e e dt ob a s et h i si n f o r m a lr o b u s t n e s so rs e n s i t i v i t ye x e r c i s e so ns p e c i ﬁc decision
criterion, like for example the maxmin. Indeed, there is no need to adopt any criteria at all for
decision under uncertainty, nor to know the policymaker’s preferences towards risk. Instead of
incorporating risk preferences in the formal optimisation problem and work out one optimal
policy, the approach followed here - in a sense - works in the reverse. It presents the policymaker
with a menu of options from which she could choose, thereby letting her reveal her priors about
the likelihood of speciﬁce v e n t so rh e rt a s t ef o rr i s k ,e l e m e n t sw h i c ha r ei na n yc a s ev e r yd i f ﬁcult
to elicit and formalise.
Chart 4-6 report the results of the experiment described above for a bubble assumed to grow 10%
a year (keeping other factors constant). Each chart corresponds to a different weight λ on output
stabilisation, and each plot in a given chart refers to a bubble of different expected duration
(=1/p). Each line in a plot corresponds to a true value of the probability q. Clearly, this has a
minimum for q =ˆ q. All losses are computed using an algorithm similar to the one presented in
Section 2.(26) All losses are normalised so that the loss corresponding to ˆ q = q = 0i ne a c hc h a r t
equals one.
Consider ﬁrst Chart 4, in which the policymaker has an equal concern for output and inﬂation
stabilisation (i.e. λ=1), which we will take as the benchmark. Three features are immediately
apparent from this chart. First, there is a value of ˆ q which guarantees a minimum loss under all
realisations of q. This is the minmax value of ˆ q, which we indicate with ˆ qMM. For bubbles
expected to last between 1 and 3 periods, this value is comprised between 40 and 50%, which
(26)More precisely, the decision rules ut =−F(st)xt are taken as given, instead of being derived from the ﬁrst order
conditions of the optimisation problem. These are then replaced into the Bellman equations. Going through the same
steps as described in Section 2, one obtains a system of interrelated Lyapunov equations, which can be solved by
iteration in the same manner as the Riccati equations therein.
26roughly corresponds to attach no (or very small) weight to the exchange rate in the decision rule.
For a bubble expected to last 5 periods, the robust value of q falls to around 25%. Second, the
losses are asymmetric: they tend to be higher when q rises above ˆ qMM than vice versa. To put it
differently, overestimating the probability of a bubble can lead to worse outcomes than
underestimating it. Note that a missing value on the chart indicates an inﬁnite loss.(27) Hence,
assuming that there is a bubble with a high probability ˆ q when in fact there is none (i.e. q = 0)
can lead to a catastrophic outcome. Third, as the expected duration of the bubble increases there
appear to be ever smaller variation in the losses for different realisations of q, but it remains true
that overestimating the probability of moving into a bubble is considerably more costly than
underestimating it. The losses tend to ﬂatten for all values of ˆ q but especially for the initial ones.
Chart 5 refers to the case in which the concern for inﬂation stabilisation dominates (i.e. λ=.1).(28)
Again, the ‘robust’ value of ˆ q is just below 50% for bubbles of expected duration up to three
periods, decreasing for bubble of more extended length. And, losses tend to ﬂatten as the expected
length of the bubble rises. The most striking featu r ei sh o wi m m e d i a t e l ys t e e pt h el o s sb e c o m e sa s
ˆ q increases above ˆ qMM when there is in fact no bubble, q = 0. Therefore, in the case of
quasi-strict inﬂation targeting it is never ‘safe’ to assume q >.5. Chart 6 show the same plots for
the case in which the policymaker has a greater concern about output stabilisation than inﬂation
stabilisation (i.e. λ=3). Again, putting a large weight on the existence of a bubble can lead to a
very bad outcome when a bubble in fact does not arise. Another thing to notice is that as output
stabilisation becomes more important, the lossesg e ts m a l l e rc o m p a r e dt ot h et w op r e v i o u sc a s e s .
Chart 7 refers to the case in which λ=1 and the bubble grows by 30% a year, instead of 10% unlike
the previous charts. Even for faster growing bubbles, the general picture emerging from the other
charts remains unaltered.
To recap, it appears that the a mistake in the choice of the probability has worse consequences
when the policymaker is targeting inﬂation strictly. Indeed, the dispersion of relative losses is
generally smaller as more weight is put on output stabilisation. Unless the bubble is expected to
last for long, the safest strategy for a policymaker who has a strong preference for the early
resolution of uncertainty is to select a probability q of between 40% and 50%. It is better to
underestimate than overestimate the probability of moving into a bubble. And ﬁnally, the size of
(27)In this case the algorithm that solves for the value function for a given policy produces an inﬁnite norm.
(28)This is almost strict inﬂation targeting. We do not report the case of strict inﬂation targeting because it produces
too many extreme outcomes.
27the bubble does not appear to alter these conclusions.
The above results about the minmax probability can be compared to those normally found in the
robust control literature, in which uncertainty concerns the set of feasible parameters or models
(see e.g. Svensson (2000) and the literature cited therein). As stressed by Svensson (2000), a
preference for robustness often leads to choose a parameter which is on the boundary of the
feasible set of models. By contrast, a desire for robustness in the present context leads,
interestingly, to pick an intermediate value of the probability.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The current paper is meant to be an initial step towards understanding how policy should be set in
economic environment characterised by important non linearities, such as when asset prices
undergo periods of sustained and prolonged booms followed by sudden and large adjustment
towards their long-run equilibrium. To the author’s knowledge the proposed optimal control
problem presented in the paper is new in the economic literature. One of its advantages is its
relative simplicity: the problem solved by the policymaker is effectively non-linear/quadratic but
maintains all the advantages of the linear quadratic framework. A general implications for
monetary policy is that, at least in principle, the decision rules are state-contingent and therefore
must adapt to changing economic circumstances. We apply this tool to study how monetary
policy should be set in a stylised small open economy model in which the real exchange rate
alternates between periods of booms and busts, namely periods in which it tends to move away
from its long-run equilibrium (bubbles) and periods in which abruptly returns to it (crashes).
O n el i m i t a t i o no ft h ec u r r e n tt o o li st h a ti ta p p lies to backward looking models. Extending it to
models that allow for forward-looking agents is clearly desirable as such models are the natural
setting for modelling asset prices. A further extension is to make the state of the world a latent
variable, which therefore need to be estimated through some ﬁltering problem. These are the next
steps in our research agenda.
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31Chart 1: Contour lines for optimal response coefﬁcients. Strict inﬂation targeting λ=0;




























































































































































































32Chart 2: Contour lines for optimal response coefﬁcients: λ=1; bubble growing 20% a year.












































































































































































































33Chart 3: Contour lines for optimal response coefﬁcients: λ=5; bubble growing 20% a year.


















































































































































































































































































































Relative losses as a function of the probability chosen by the policymaker, ˆ q, for different values of
the true probability q.N o t e :λ=1. Bubble grows 10% a year. Missing values indicate ∞.
Losses conditioned on ‘no bubble’ regime.
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Relative losses as a function of the probability chosen by the policymaker, ˆ q, for different values of
the true probability q.N o t e :λ=0.1. Bubble grows 10% a year. Missing values indicate ∞.
Losses conditioned on ‘no bubble’ regime.
36.
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Relative losses as a function of the probability chosen by the policymaker, ˆ q, for different values of
the true probability q.N o t e :λ=3. Bubble grows 10% a year. Missing values indicate ∞.
Losses conditioned on ‘no bubble’ regime.
377a:



































































































































Relative losses as a function of the probability chosen by the policymaker, ˆ q, for different values of
the true probability q.N o t e :λ=1. Bubble grows 30% a year. Missing values indicate ∞.
Losses conditioned on ‘no bubble’ regime.
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